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Gangemi, Amelia; Tenore, Katia; Mancini, Francesco
Two reasoning strategies in patients with psychological illnesses Journal Article
In: Frontiers in Psychology , 2019.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: Anxiety disorders, corroboratory strategy, Emotions, Hyper Emotion Theory, Obsessive-compulsive disorders, reasoning, Refutatory strategy
@article{Gangemi2019b,
title = {Two reasoning strategies in patients with psychological illnesses},
author = {Amelia Gangemi and Katia Tenore and Francesco Mancini},
editor = {Frontiers},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2019-two-reasoning-Mancini-1.pdf},
doi = {doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02335},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-01-01},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology },
abstract = {The hyper-emotion theory states that psychological disorders are conditions in which individuals experience emotions that are appropriate to the situation but inappropriate in their intensity. When these individuals experience such an emotion, they inevitably are compelled to reason about its cause. They therefore develop characteristic strategies of reasoning depending on the particular hyper-emotion they experience. In anxiety disorders (e.g., panic attack, social phobia), the perception of a threat leads to hyper anxiety, and the reasoning is corroboratory, adducing evidence that confirms the risk (corroboratory strategy). In obsessive-compulsive disorders, the perception of the threat of having acted in an irresponsible way leads to both hyper anxiety and guilt, and the reasoning is refutatory , adducing only evidence disconfirming the risk of being guilty (refutatory strategy). We report three empirical studies corroborating these hypotheses. They demostrate that patients themselves recognize the two strategies and spontaneously use them in therapeutic sessions and in evaluating scenarios in an experiment.},
keywords = {Anxiety disorders, corroboratory strategy, Emotions, Hyper Emotion Theory, Obsessive-compulsive disorders, reasoning, Refutatory strategy},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Gangemi, Amelia; Mancini, Francesco; Johnson-Laird, P. N.
Emotion, reasoning, and psychopathology Miscellaneous
2013, ISBN: 978-1-84872-118-0.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: Emotion, reasoning
@misc{Blanchette2013,
title = {Emotion, reasoning, and psychopathology},
author = {Amelia Gangemi and Francesco Mancini and P.N. Johnson-Laird},
editor = {Isabelle Blanchette and Psychology Press},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/emotion-reasoning-and-psychopathology-Gangemi-Mancini-Johnson-Laird.pdf},
doi = {10.4324/9781315888538},
isbn = {978-1-84872-118-0},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-09-19},
pages = {-1},
publisher = {Routledge},
abstract = {This chapter addresses the two main mysteries of psychopathology: what causes psychological illnesses and what maintains them. One prevalent view is that both result from faulty reasoning. Yet, healthy individuals also err in their reasoning. The chapter outlines an alternative account, the hyper-emotion theory that attributes these illnesses to emotions of a pathological intensity.
These hyper-emotions enhance patients’ reasoning, which in turn prolongs their illnesses. Empirical studies corroborate this theory.
They show that basic emotions tend to occur al the onset of psychological illnesses, that psychiatrists and patient can identify the strategies of reasoninf in different illnesses, even when the content is held constant, and that patients suffering from a psycholocical illness reason better than control participants about contentspertinent to their illnesses. Psychological illnesses are acordingly disorders in emotion, not intellect.},
keywords = {Emotion, reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {misc}
}
These hyper-emotions enhance patients’ reasoning, which in turn prolongs their illnesses. Empirical studies corroborate this theory.
They show that basic emotions tend to occur al the onset of psychological illnesses, that psychiatrists and patient can identify the strategies of reasoninf in different illnesses, even when the content is held constant, and that patients suffering from a psycholocical illness reason better than control participants about contentspertinent to their illnesses. Psychological illnesses are acordingly disorders in emotion, not intellect.
Gangemi, Amelia; Mancini, Francesco; Johnson-Laird, P. N.
Models and cognitive change in psychopathology Journal Article
In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, vol. 25, no 2, pp. 157-164, 2013.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: beliefs, Emotions, Hyper-emotion theory, Psychological illnesses, reasoning, Syllogisms
@article{Gangemi2013,
title = {Models and cognitive change in psychopathology},
author = {Amelia Gangemi and Francesco Mancini and P. N. Johnson-Laird},
editor = {Psychology Press},
url = {https://apc.it/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/2012_models_and_cognitive_change_in_psychopathology.pdf},
doi = {10.1080/20445911.2012.737318},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Cognitive Psychology},
volume = {25},
number = {2},
pages = {157-164},
abstract = {The hyper-emotion theory attributes psychological illnesses to emotions of aberrant intensity, which in turn prompt better reasoning about their causes. Two experiments in which participants drew their own conclusions from syllogistic premises tested this prediction. Individuals from the same populations as the experimental participants rated the believability of likely conclusions. One experiment compared patients with depression with controls, and the other experiment compared students scoring high on anxiety with controls. Controls tended to draw believable conclusions and not to draw unbelievable conclusions, and this belief bias was greater for invalid inferences. The clinical groups were better reasoners than the controls, and did not show belief bias. As our hypothesis predicted, they drew many more valid conclusions concerning their illness than controls drew valid believable conclusions. But, contrary to the hypothesis, they refrained from drawing invalid conclusions about neutral topics more than controls refrained from drawing invalid unbelievable conclusions.},
keywords = {beliefs, Emotions, Hyper-emotion theory, Psychological illnesses, reasoning, Syllogisms},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Johnson-Laird, Philippe N.; Mancini, Francesco; Gangemi, Amelia
A hyper-emotion theory of psychological illnesse Journal Article
In: Psychological Review 113, No. 4, 822–841, vol. 113, no 4, pp. 822–841, 2006.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tag: cognitive therapy, Emotions, Psychological illnesses, reasoning, unconscious processes
@article{Johnson-Laird2006,
title = {A hyper-emotion theory of psychological illnesse},
author = {Philippe N. Johnson-Laird and Francesco Mancini and Amelia Gangemi},
editor = {the American Psychological Association},
url = {http://mentalmodels.princeton.edu/papers/2006hyperemotiontheory.pdf},
doi = {10.1037/0033-295X.113.4.822},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-01-01},
journal = {Psychological Review 113, No. 4, 822–841},
volume = {113},
number = {4},
pages = {822–841},
abstract = {A “hyper-emotion” theory of psychological illnesses is presented. The theory postulates the processes that construct bodily feelings and basic emotions are computationally crude and outside voluntary control. Psychological illnesses have an onset in which a cognitive evaluation initiates a sequence of unconscious transitions yielding a basic emotion.
This emotion is appropriate for the situation but inappropriate in its intensity. Whenever it recurs, it leads individuals to focus on the precipitating situation, and to characteristic patterns of inference that can bolster the illness. Individuals with a propensity to psychological illness accordingly reason better than more robust individuals, but only on topics relevant to their illness. The theory is assessed in light of previous studies, a small epidemiological study of patients, and three empirical studies},
keywords = {cognitive therapy, Emotions, Psychological illnesses, reasoning, unconscious processes},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This emotion is appropriate for the situation but inappropriate in its intensity. Whenever it recurs, it leads individuals to focus on the precipitating situation, and to characteristic patterns of inference that can bolster the illness. Individuals with a propensity to psychological illness accordingly reason better than more robust individuals, but only on topics relevant to their illness. The theory is assessed in light of previous studies, a small epidemiological study of patients, and three empirical studies