Ricerca pubblicazioni scientifiche

CERCA UN ARTICOLO

Visualizza tutti

2018

 40
  65
276

Moral Judgment and empathic/Deontological Guilt

Simone Migliore, Giulia D'Aurizio, Francesca Parisi, Sabrina Maffi, Barbara Squitieri, Giuseppe Curcio, Francesco Mancini

ABSTRACT: People often make complicated decisions to help or to punish perfect strangers. Harming someone or breaking some moral imperative is usually linked to feeling guilt, and several researches suggested the existence of two different kinds of guilt: altruistic/empathic and deontological. Aim Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific ...

Journal Article: Psychological Reports, pp. 1-17, 2018.

2013

 40
  65
923

Models and cognitive change in psychopathology

Amelia Gangemi, Francesco Mancini, P. N. Johnson-Laird

ABSTRACT: The hyper-emotion theory attributes psychological illnesses to emotions of aberrant intensity, which in turn prompt better reasoning about their causes. Two experiments in which participants drew their own conclusions from syllogistic premises tested this prediction. Individuals from the same populations as the experimental participants rated the believability of likely conclusions. One experiment compared patients ...

Journal Article: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 25 (2), pp. 157-164, 2013.

2011

 40
  65
1249

Eliciting Guilty Feeling: A preliminary Study Differentiating Deontological and Altruistic Guilt

Barbara Basile, Francesco Mancini

ABSTRACT: Guilt has been identified as both an intrapsychic and an interpersonal emotion. The current study presents evidence of the existence of two senses of guilt, deontological and altruistic guilt, induced through different experimental paradigms. Deontological guilt evolves from having slighted moral authority or norms, while altruistic guilt arises from selfish behavior and the distress of others. We hypothesize that ...

Journal Article: Psychology, 2 (2), pp. 98-102, 2011.

2006

 40
  65
1303

A hyper-emotion theory of psychological illnesse

Philippe N. Johnson-Laird, Francesco Mancini, Amelia Gangemi

ABSTRACT: A “hyper-emotion” theory of psychological illnesses is presented. The theory postulates the processes that construct bodily feelings and basic emotions are computationally crude and outside voluntary control. Psychological illnesses have an onset in which a cognitive evaluation initiates a sequence of unconscious transitions yielding a basic emotion. This emotion is appropriate for the situation but ...

Journal Article: Psychological Review 113, No. 4, 822–841, 113 (4), pp. 822–841, 2006.